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Theultimatumgameisasimplenegotiationwiththeinterestingpropertythatpeoplefrequentlyrejectoffers
of ‘free’ money. These rejections contradict the standard view of economic rationality. This divergence
betweeneconomictheoryandhumanbehaviourisimportantandhasnobroadlyacceptedcause.Thisstudy
examines the relationship between ultimatum game rejections and testosterone. In a variety of species,
testosterone is associated with male seeking dominance. If low ultimatum game offers are interpreted as
challenges,thenhigh-testosteronemenmaybemorelikelytorejectsuchoffers.Inthisexperiment,menwho
reject low offers ($5 out of $40) have signiﬁcantly higher testosterone levels than those who accept. In
addition,hightestosteronelevelsareassociatedwithhigherultimatumgameoffers,butthissecondﬁndingis
not statistically signiﬁcant.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the ultimatum game, one person (‘proposer’) makes an
offer to a second person (‘responder’) on how to divide a
sum of money. This offer is ﬁnal—an ultimatum—so if the
responder rejects it, there is no agreement, and neither
person receives any money. Since rejections result in no
money for either party, economic theories of self-interest
predict that responders will accept all positive offers (Stahl
1972; Rubinstein 1982).
Contrary to these predictions, the ﬁrst ultimatum game
experiment reported that low offers were frequently
rejected (Guth et al. 1982). This deviation between
behaviour and that predicted by standard theory has
been replicated in myriad studies (Roth 1995), including
games played for large stakes (Hoffman et al. 1996;
Cameron 1999) and cross-culturally (Roth et al. 1991;
Henrich et al. 2001).
There is no broadly accepted explanation for these
rejections, which contradict the standard deﬁnition of
rationality. One prominent suggestion is that people have a
taste for ‘fairness’, and thus ultimatum game rejections
make people not only poorer, but also happier (Bolton
1991; Rabin 1993; Fehr & Schmidt 1999). Iffairness is the
proximate cause of ultimatum game rejections, it raises the
question of the origin of this preferences. One suggestion
is that people act ‘as if’ there is some chance that accepting
low offers will damage their reputation and cost them in
future interactions (Page & Nowak 2000). If it is possible
that behaviour will be repeated (or simply observed), then
the rejection of small offers may be rational (Alexander
1987, 2006; Bolton 1997; Ellingsen 1997; Nowak et al.
2000). This reputation-management machinery may be
used by experimental subjects even in anonymous settings
with no opportunity to develop reputations.
Since testosterone modulates behaviour across many
species, and in settings that may be construed to be similar
to the ultimatum game, it allows an interesting test of this
explanation. If ultimatum game rejections result from the
inappropriate activation of reputation-management
machinery, then a body of research suggests that rejections
will be more probable among high-testosterone men.
High-testosterone animals are more likely to respond
aggressively to a challenge, and low offers may be viewed
as challenges. Across multiple species, including humans,
high testosterone levels are correlated with dominance-
seeking behaviour (Mazur & Booth 1998), and dominants
are less likely to back down from challenges.
There is considerable cross-species support for the role
of testosterone in status and aggression. In a number of
bird species, exogenous testosterone increases male–male
competition (Silverin 1980; Hegner & Wingﬁeld 1987).
High-ranking chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have higher
testosterone levels than low-ranking individuals, and they
a r em o r ea g g r e s s i v e( Muller & Wrangham 2004).
Similarly, dominant male wild mountain gorillas (Gorilla
gorilla beringei) have higher testosterone levels than
subordinate males (Robbins & Czekala 1997).
Among men, there is a consistent, positive relationship
between aggression and testosterone (Book et al. 2001).
High-testosterone men are rated as less friendly and more
dominant (Dabbs 1997). Men who are looking for sexual
partners, and therefore engaging in a form of male–male
competition,havehighertestosteronelevelsthanthosewho
are not seeking partners (Dabbs & Booth 1993; Burnham
et al. 2003; Gray et al. 2004; McIntyre et al. 2006).
Adaptive models of aggression suggest that high-
testosterone animals are more willing to incur the costs
of conﬂict because of the compensating beneﬁts (Mazur
1973, 1983, 1985; Wingﬁeld 1984; Kemper 1990;
Wingﬁeld et al. 1990). In short, testosterone modulates a
reputation-management system, where high-testosterone
males are more willing to engagein conﬂict (Ellison2001).
In a review article on punishment, Clutton-Brock & Parker
(1995) conclude that ‘negative reciprocity is used by
dominant animals to resist subordinate members from
indulging in a behaviour that threatens the ﬁtness of the
dominant members’.
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low second-to-fourth digit (2D : 4D) ratios are associated
with men’s willingness to reject low ultimatum game offers
(Van den Bergh & Dewitte 2006). Low 2D : 4D ratios are
believed to reﬂect high foetal exposure to androgens
(Manning et al. 1998), but the relationship between
2D : 4D ratios and adult circulating T levels is ambiguous
(Manning et al. 2004). One study reports that testosterone
injections increase punishment levels among male subjects
in an economic game (Kouri et al. 1995), which suggests
that men with naturally high testosterone levels may reject
low ultimatum game offers.
Do people interpret low ultimatum game offers as a
challenge? In a neuroeconomic study, low ultimatum
game offers caused increased brain activation in the
anterior insula, a brain region associated with anger and
disgust (Sanfey et al. 2003). Furthermore, subjects in this
neuroeconomic study were more likely to reject low offers
from people than similar offers from a computer,
consistent with the reputation-management hypothesis
and an earlier study (Blount 1995).
In summary, if men interpret low ultimatum game
offers as a challenge, then those with higher testosterone
levels will be more likely to reject the offer.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
Thirty subjects began the experiment and 26 completed (four
subjects were not present on the day of the ultimatum game).
All subjects were male graduate students enrolled at Harvard
University. Each subject had completed a minimum of two
semesters of graduate microeconomics including an intro-
duction to game theory. The experiment was approved by the
Harvard University’s committee on the use of human subjects
in research.
The game was played for stakes of $40. Each pair was paid.
Allaspectsofthegamewerepublicknowledgetoallplayers,and
therewasnodeception.Subjectswereaskedfor theirbehaviour
in both roles, proposer and responder, then paired anon-
ymously. Roles were assigned randomly after all decisions were
made. Subjects were paid based on their choices.
Ultimatum offers were constrained to be either $25 out of
$40or$5outof$40.Thesetwochoiceswerepickedtogenerate
aroughlyevensplitbetweenhighandlowoffers. Giventhatthe
focus of the experiment was on rejection behaviour, it was
desirable to make the low offer a probable proposal. In many
publishedstudies,lowoffersarerareandmedianoffersareclose
to half of the available money (e.g. Guth et al. 1982). Some
studiesthatfocusonrejectionsoflowoffersdonotuserealoffers
(e.g.Sanfeyetal.2003).Theparticularsofthisexperimentwere
designed to have subjects face a signiﬁcant probability of a low
offer actually given by the proposer.
All the testosterone assays were performed by the author.
Saliva samples were identiﬁed only by an anonymous subject
ID, so that testosterone levels were assessed without any
knowledge of the subjects’ ultimatum game behaviour.
Testosterone was sampled from saliva using a methodology
developed by Peter Ellison and members of his laboratory
(Ellison 1988). Collection tubes were prepared containing a
small amount of sodium azide, a substance that prevents
bacterial growth and sample contamination. Subjects pro-
vided saliva samples in small volumes (3–5 ml) that were
deposited in tubes. The samples were frozen for several
months, then thawed and analysed using standard protocols.
These well-established procedures involve multiple levels of
error correction.
Testosterone levels vary in a predictable fashion through-
out the day. The experiment was conducted in the early
afternoon because the rate of change in the diurnal cycle is
lowest during this period. Accordingly, subjects provided
baseline samples at 14.00 on 3 non-experimental days. On
the day of the ultimatum game, subjects reported at 13.00
and made their decisions at approximately 14.00.
3. RESULTS
As predicted, men who rejected low ultimatum game
offers ($5 out of $40) had signiﬁcantly higher testosterone
levels than those who accepted (p!0.01, one-sided
t-test). For each subject, testosterone level is estimated
by averaging three samples given on different days. As
shown in table 1 and ﬁgure 1, rejecters (six) had an average
testosterone level of 383 pmol l
K1 versus an average of
251 pmol l
K1 for those who accepted (20).
This result is robust over several tests. The effect is
present beyond the pZ0.05 value if logged values of
testosterone are used instead of raw values. It is also
present beyond the pZ0.05 value if anyone of the subjects
is removed from the sample, or if any one of the subject’s
rejection behaviour is switched from reject to accept or
vice versa.
Furthermore, the relationship between testosterone
and behaviour is visible by looking at the data. For subjects
with above-average testosterone, 45% rejected the $5 offer
versus 7% of the men with below-average testosterone. Of
the seven men with the highest testosterone levels, ﬁve
rejected $5, whereas only one of the 19 men with the
lowest testosterone levels rejected $5.
It is also possible to examine the relationship between
ultimatum game offers and testosterone levels. Table 2
summarizes the ﬁnding that men who offered $25 out of
$40 had higher average testosterone levels than those who
offered $5 out of $40, but this difference is not signiﬁcant
at the pZ0.05 level. Men who made larger offers (11) had
an average testosterone level of 313 pmol l
K1 versus an
Table 1. Testosterone level in men and their responses in an
ultimatum game.
N
average testosterone
(pmol l
K1) s.e.
reject $5/$40 6 383 37
accept $5/$40 20 251 16
all 26 281
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Figure 1. Subjects who reject $5 out of $40 have signiﬁcantly
higher testosterone levels than those who accept.
2328 T.C. Burnham High-testosterone men and ultimatums
Proc. R. Soc. B (2007)average of 257 pmol l
K1 for those who made smaller offers
(15), (pO0.10, two-sided t-test). The two-sided t-test was
used because there was no pre-experimental hypothesis
regarding ultimatum game offers and testosterone levels.
4. DISCUSSION
‘Moralistic aggression’ is Robert Trivers’ term for punish-
ment used to modulate reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971).
In this study, punishment of low ultimatum game offers is
correlated with high levels of testosterone. This ﬁnding was
predicted based on a hypothesis that ultimatum game
rejections are caused, at least in part, by psychological
mechanisms for reciprocal altruism being mobilized in an
experimental environment constructed to make reciprocity
impossible. In settings where people might interact more
than once, punishment may enhance the reputation of the
punisher, and it may alter the behaviour of the punished.
Both routes may produce beneﬁts to the punisher that
exceed the cost of punishment.
The result of this study is consistent with prior work
reporting increased neural activation in response to low
ultimatum game offers (Sanfey et al. 2003). An evolved
psychology to modulate reciprocal altruism ought to be
very concerned about unequal divisions. An interesting
follow-up study would be to look at both testosterone
levels and neural activation in the presence of low
ultimatum game offers. The suggestion is that high-
testosterone men would have relatively stronger emotional
responses to low offers.
A number of further testosterone experiments are
suggested. It would be useful to replicate this study with
more individuals and subjects drawn from a variety of
populations. There is also a literature on biological
responses to challenges (Sapolsky 1990; Wagner et al.
2002) that suggests studies looking at hormonal changes
after economic actions.
This study used only men because testosterone seems to
play a more central role in male behaviour than in female
behaviour. However, there is a considerable literature on
women and testosterone that reveals some of the same
correlations between testosterone and behaviour (Dabbs &
Hargrove 1997; Grant & France 2001).
An obvious extension would be to study testosterone in
other well-known economic games, such as the prisoners’
dilemma, dictator game and public goods game. However,
this study alone does not provide clear predictions for
behaviour in other settings. If testosterone is a useful proxy
for human status, then a prediction requires an under-
standing of the relationship between behaviour and status
in the relevant context. While the literature on the
response of dominants to challenges is deep and relatively
unambiguous, the existence of similar literature relevantto
other economic games is less apparent.
There are other well-known biological markers that
might be relevant to the study of economic behaviour.
Fluctuating asymmetry (FA), for example, is a frequently
used measure of developmental stability and is correlated
with a range of behaviours in myriad species (Gangestad &
Thornhill 1999). A study of FA and the ultimatum
game reports that more asymmetric men (high FA) make
larger ultimatum game offers, but ﬁnds no relationship
between FA and ultimatum game rejections (Zaatari &
Trivers 2007).
Ultimatum game rejections have become important
because mainstream economic theory fails to predict this
behaviour.Thedivergencebetweenactualhumanbehaviour
and that predicted by economic theory has played a central
role in the rise of behavioural economics. If our under-
standing of ultimatum game rejections and other related
phenomena can be improved through studies of hormones,
morphology and neurological activity, the ramiﬁcations for
economics might be quite broad and positive.
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